The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001 and the Protection of the Airline Industry: A Bill for the American People by Mariani, Raymond L.
Journal of Air Law and Commerce
Volume 67 | Issue 1 Article 8
2002
The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund
of 2001 and the Protection of the Airline Industry:
A Bill for the American People
Raymond L. Mariani
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Air Law and
Commerce by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Raymond L. Mariani, The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001 and the Protection of the Airline Industry: A Bill for the
American People, 67 J. Air L. & Com. 141 (2002)
https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc/vol67/iss1/8
THE SEPTEMBER 11TH VICTIM COMPENSATION FUND
OF 2001 AND THE PROTECTION OF THE AIRLINE




II. OVERVIEW OF THE LEGISLATION ..............
A. THE AIRLINE ASSISTANCE PACKAGE ..............
B. THE FUND ......................................
1. General Legislative Provisions ................
2. The R ule ....................................
a. Claimant Eligibility ....................
b. Two Tracks to Awards .................
c. "Presumptive" Economic Loss for
D ecedents .............................
d. Economic Loss for Survivor Claims ....
e. Noneconomic Loss Awards ............
f. Collateral Source Deductions ..........
g. Attorneys Fees .........................
C. LIMITATIONS ON LAWSUITS ......................
1. Capping Industry Exposure ...................
2. M ore R ules ..................................
III. THE VERY SHORT HISTORY OF THE
LEGISLATIO N .....................................
V. IS THE FUND THE BEST CHOICE FOR
CLAIM ANTS? ......................................




















* B.S., 1984 Boston University, Journalism, J.D., 1987 Georgetown University
Law Center.
The author practices in New York as litigation counsel to manufacturers, airlines,
airports, and other corporations in the aviation industry, coverage counsel to
insurers, and a mediator for the U.S. District Court, EDNY. The views are solely
those of the author.
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
B. APPLYING THE "SUPER" COLLATERAL SOURCE
R U LE ........................................... 176
C. How CLAIMANTS MIGHT FARE AT THE
COURTHOUSE ................................... 177
1. L iability ..................................... 177
2. D am ages .................................... 179
D. WEIGHING LITIGATION RISKS WILL LEAD MOST
TO SEEK FUND AwARDS ......................... 182
V. IS THE PROTECTION OF THE AIRLINE
INDUSTRY JUSTIFIED? ........................... 183
VI. CONCLUSION ...................................... 185
I. INTRODUCTION
THE TERRORIST ACTS of September 11, 2001 shook an al-
ready unstable aviation industry to the core and for a mo-
ment in time, an entire nation. The attacks perpetrated on four
airline flights that crashed at the World Trade Center in New
York City, the Pentagon in Virginia, and in Shanksville, Penn-
sylvania ("the Terrorist Attacks") killed and injured thousands
of innocent civilians, threatened our national security, and also
struck a blow to some sectors of an ailing economy. The Presi-
dent and Congress were immediately faced with the problems of
the airline industry; an industry that employs hundreds of
thousands of personnel and that was rapidly devastated by the
several-day mandatory shutdown. Those events were also ac-
companied by fear of travel for virtually every customer and
travel restrictions imposed by corporations on its high revenue
customer, the business traveler.
In addition to that problem, Congress faced the plight of
thousands of families who lost members in the Terrorist Attacks.
The victims left behind families, who in most instances had lost
their sole or principal wage earner. Thousands more were in-
jured. These events occurred at a time when public assistance is
limited in amount and duration, and at a time when unemploy-
ment is on the rise. This pool of victims, with no culpable party
available to pay restitution, created another financial concern of
unusual proportions. The impact on the aviation and insurance
industry would be overwhelming if only a fraction of these
claimants demanded compensation from airlines, manufactur-
ers and any other parties who had some connection, regardless
of how attenuated, to the presence of the terrorists on these
aircraft.
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If that were not enough to rattle the industry, the property
damage claims began to quickly tally into the billions. The de-
struction of several office buildings, including One and Two
World Trade Center, would involve subrogation claims by prop-
erty insurers. Other businesses in lower Manhattan were imme-
diately shut down and some may never reopen. Estimates of the
financial impact in New York focus on whether the bill can be
kept below $100 billion.
Rather than wait for the assemblage of committee reports,
blue ribbon panels and the like, the House of Representatives
moved quickly, some now say, too quickly, to pass a bill that
would assure these employers and the public that their Govern-
ment was not prepared to merely let events run their natural
course and destroy a vital transportation industry. A House bill
was proposed, debated, passed by the House, adopted by the
Senate and presented to the President - all within ten short days
of the Terrorist Attacks. On September 22, 2001, the President
signed into law the Air Transportation Safety and System Stabili-
zation Act of 2001 ("the Act").1
The Act provides several forms of monetary relief for the avia-
tion industry, including up to $15 billion in grants and loans.2
The method for allocation of that money has been the subject of
much debate. The Act provides for airlines with larger shares of
passengers and that experienced losses to have access to more
funds.- The first loan to America West will cost it over $100 mil-
lion in fees and one third of its stock.4 The purpose of provid-
ing the aid is even more controversial. Many Congressmen
argued that the Act preserved multimillion dollar salaries of air-
line executives, but not the jobs or salaries of rank and file em-
ployees.5 These legislators pressed for relief that would have
Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act of 2001, Pub. L. No.
107-42, 115 Stat. 230 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.)
[hereinafter System Stabilization Act].
2 Id. §§ 101-107.
3 Id. § 103(b).
4 Laurence Zuckerman, More Strings on U.S. Deal for Airline, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29,
2001, at C1.
, 147 CONG. REc. H5877 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 2001) (statement of Rep. Obey);
id. at H5880 (statements of Reps. Waxman & Sanders); id. at H5889 (statements
of Reps. Brown & Brady); id. at H5890 (statements of Reps. Schakowsky & Udall).
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helped avoid employee layoffs.6 The Act did not ultimately in-
clude any linkage to employee protections. 7
In addition to this direct relief for the industry, the Act also
provided indirect relief by sharply limiting the ability of claim-
ants to sue airlines and other potentially culpable parties. If a
claimant proceeds with a lawsuit against any airline, airport, or
aircraft manufacturer, it must proceed in federal court in Man-
hattan.8 Further, no judgment can be entered against any such
defendant if it exceeds the policy limits of liability insurance is-
sued to that party.9
Since Congress could not equitably (or politically) hamper
the rights of claimants to obtain compensation without some re-
course, it created an alternative source of recovery. The Act cre-
ated a new federal fund, The September l1th Victim
Compensation Fund of 2001 ("the Fund"), to compensate vic-
tims of the Terrorist Attacks." ° For a Congress that has increas-
ingly expressed concern over a balanced budget in the last
several years, the creation of the Fund was indeed a significant
event. It creates an unprecedented form of monetary relief
from the U.S. Government for persons who were not harmed by
any act or omission of the Government. Moreover, Congress
placed no limits on the amount that claimants to the Fund can
obtain individually or in the aggregate. Considering that 3119
persons were killed in the Terrorist Attacks, claims by all would
yield awards to their estates likely exceeding $10 billion.11
Claims of injured persons will only add to this hefty sum.
Authority to fill in this blank check was delegated by Congress
to the Attorney General of the United States, who is, in turn,
authorized by the Act to appoint a Special Master.' 2 His ap-
pointee, Kenneth R. Feinberg, will exercise very broad discre-
tion in the assessment of compensation awards for the victims
and their families.'13 But despite this broad discretion, Congress
did require that all forms of collateral source benefits received
1i Id.
7 See id. at H5917 (rejection of motion to recommit bill for inclusion of health
benefits for employees laid off by airlines) (statement of Rep. Young).
8 System Stabilization Act, supra note 1, § 408(b) (3).
9 Id. § 408(a).
10 Id. §§ 401, 403.
11 A Nation Challenged; Dead and Missing, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2002, at 15.
12 System Stablization Act, supra note 1, § 404(a).
13 Diana B. Henriques, Holding the Victims' Pursestrings, Uneasily, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 11, 2001, at B1.
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by claimants, including life insurance, reduce awards.14 This va-
riance from the law of many states, including New York, has al-
ready created a disincentive for those claimants who are entitled
to receive substantial death benefits. 15
The "interim" Final Rule published by the Special Master pro-
vides general parameters on expected recovery, depending on
the age, number of dependents and income of each victim.' 6
Compensation for noneconomic damages will be paid at uni-
form amounts for all claimants. 7 Further, the Act does not pro-
vide for review of the Special Master's damage assessments by
any court or administrative body."8 He has already signaled a
reluctance to issue awards that exceed $3 million total
damages.19
The resulting limitations from this legislation on both the re-
covery from the Fund and through litigation will present some
claimants with difficult choices. The can pursue compensation
from the Fund to obtain a certain award of predictable value.
Or they might file a negligence suit against terrorist organiza-
tions and perhaps the airlines, security companies, airports, or
other property owners to place damage assessments in the
hands of juries sympathetic to their losses. Even though plain-
tiffs do have a choice for recovery, these plaintiffs will have to be
nimble enough to clear many hurdles. First, they must locate
terrorists or their organizations and prove liability for the Ter-
rorist Attacks. Second, airline industry defendants may garner
sympathy from the same juries because they too were attacked in
an act of war. Finally, plaintiffs will need a defendant with
enough resources to pay a judgment. 20
In addition to claimants involved and the airlines that avail
themselves of federal assistance, the Act also has implications for
the industry as a whole as it enters the 2 1St century. Congress
and the President may have envisioned a simple and limited in-
tervention for the airline industry to avoid disruptions more se-
14 System Stabilization Act, supra note 1, §§ 405(b) (6), 402(4).
15 Diana B. Henriques, Official Vows All Families of Victims Will Get Aid, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 28, 2001, at B7.
16 28 C.F.R. §§ 104.43, 104.45 (2002).
17 Id. §§ 104.44, 104.46.
18 Id. § 104.33(g).
N September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 66 Fed. Reg. 66,274
(Dec. 21, 2001) (codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 104) [hereinafter Victim Compensation
Fund].
20 7 Families Sue Bin Laden and Others for Billions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2002, at
All.
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vere than those already caused by the Terrorist Attacks.
However, the Government appears to have taken a first step
back to the days before deregulation of the industry.
The strings that the Government attached to the first airline
loan under the Act for America West point to a Government
intent on exercising close oversight of the industry. By injecting
itself to such an extent in daily airline operations, have the Con-
gress and the President agreed that the free market is too strong
for the good of the industry? Was a deregulated industry, re-
peatedly showing signs of distress, primed for one blow that
would cause several airlines to capitulate? The airlines appear
determined to use the loan program only as a last resort and
maintain their independence."
This article examines the Act, including aid to the airlines,
creation of the Fund, and limitations on lawsuits. It reviews the
Rule promulgated by the Special Master for the Fund and how
claimants might proceed to recover damages. The legislative
history is considered for motivations on passing the Act. This
article also addresses whether claimants will ultimately benefit
from the Fund in lieu of filing suit under the constraints im-
posed by the Act. Finally, this article considers whether these
various forms of protection for the airline industry are justified.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE LEGISLATION
The Act was introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives
as House Resolution 2926 on September 12, 2001.22 The Presi-
dent signed the bill into law on September 22, 2001. The Act is
divided into six major titles, or sections. Titles 1, 11 and III are
directed to the first of two goals, direct financial assistance to
the airlines through grants and loans. Title IV fulfills the sec-
ond goal of indirect assistance to the industry in the form of
restrictions on claimants' ability to sue, and the creation of the
compensation Fund for victims. Title V supports the President's
request to spend an additional $3 billion to support airline
safety and security. Title VI is a separability provision.
A. AIRLINE ASSISTANCE PACKAGE
Title I, Airline Stabilization, provides several forms of relief
for the airline industry to remedy past losses and expected losses
21 Micheline Maynard, Airlines Shy Away from Loan Guarantees By U.S., N.Y.
TiMES, Jan. 3, 2002, at C1.
22 H.R. 2926, 107th Cong. (2001).
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in revenues caused by the Terrorist Attacks. The Act provides
for loans via federal credit instruments to air carriers, up to an
aggregate of $10 billion.23 The federal credit instruments are to
be distributed through an Air Transportation Stabilization
Board.2 4 The members of that Board are the following officials
or their designee: Chairman of the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, designated as chair; the Secretary of
Transportation; the Secretary of the Treasury; and the Comp-
troller General as a nonvoting member.25
Applications for loans through the program must be filed by
June 28, 2002.26 The Government has the right to obtain equity
in the company upon providing the loan backing to a carrier, a
concept that would have been immediately rejected prior to
September l1th. 27 The position of Government vis-a-vis the air-
line industry, while not moving 180 degrees, has undergone a
radical shift. The Government no longer sees a close relation-
ship with these private corporations as inconsistent with the ba-
sic principles of capitalism and the role of Government in our
economic system. Instead, the Act explicitly authorizes the
Board to enter contracts that allow the Government to reap
gains from the borrower airline's operations, through warrants,
stock options, stock, or other equity investments. 28
The Office of Management and Budget ("OMB") issued regu-
lations to govern the application process. 29 Due to time con-
straints, public comment was not solicited. 0 OMB stated that it
was exempt from the requirements of the Administrative Proce-
dure Act for a notice of rulemaking. 1
The regulations are extremely detailed and extend eligibility
to all carriers, including those in bankruptcy. Key aspects of the
regulations include:
* The loan cannot be guaranteed 100 percent by the
Government. 32
23 System Stabilization Act, supra note 1, § 101(a) (1).
24 Id. § 102(b)-(d).
25 Id. § 102(b)(2).
26 14 C.F.R. § 1300.16 (2002).
27 System Stabilization Act, supra note 1, § 102(d)(1)-(2).
28 Id.
29 14 C.F.R. § 1300.
30 Supplementing Information, Preamble to 14 C.F.R. §1300 (not reprinted in
the Code of Federal Regulations), available at www.whitehouse.gov/omb.
31 Id.
32 14 C.F.R. § 1300.14.
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* The loan must be repaid within seven years. 3
* A fee is required and will escalate each year that the loan is
outstanding. 4
* Approval of an application will depend on ability to repay,
protection of Government financial interests and lender ability
to administer the loan.3 5
The Board also has discretion to prioritize applications based
on:
1. A business plan that is financially sound;
2. Greater participation in the loan by non-Federal entities;
3. Greater participation in the loan by private entities as op-
posed to non-Federal public entities;
4. Warrants or other equity instruments that will allow the fed-
eral government to participate in the gains of the company;
5. Concession by creditors, employees, or others that will
strengthen the financial condition of the company;
6. The loan proceeds will not be used for payment or refi-
nancing of existing debt;
7. A reduction in the risk of default to the government by
reducing the length of the loan, by pledges of collateral, and by
other financial structures that minimize the Federal govern-
ment's risk and cost associated with making the loan
guarantees.36
America West, the eighth largest carrier in the United States,
submitted the first application for the federally backed loan pro-
gram. 7 On November 13, 2001, America West applied for a
government guarantee of $400 million on a loan of $426 mil-
lion.3 ' The terms initially proposed a government fee of $100
million.
The application began a struggle between fiscal conservatives
who are cautious about putting billions of taxpayer dollars at
3 Id. § 1300.15(a).
34 Id. § 1300.18(d).
35 Id. § 1300.17(b)(1)-(3).
36 Id. § 1300.17(b)(4).
37 It is a noteworthy coincidence that America West is the only carrier created
since deregulation with over $1 billion in annual revenues. See Laurence Zucker-
man, America West is First Test of U.S. Airline Bailout Program, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27,
2001, at Cl.
38 Id.
39 Laurence Zuckerman, America West Revises Request to Offer U.S. 10% of Airline,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2001, at Cl.
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risk, and the airline industry and its Congressional supporters. 40
Some in Congress had already expressed concern that the
Board would be able to pick the winners and losers in the econ-
omy.41 The Board denied this charge.4 2
The Board asked America West to revise its application,
prompting criticism from some in Congress. 43 The fee was in-
creased to $175 million, plus warrants were offered for the Gov-
ernment to buy 3.4 million shares of stock.44 The warrants
would convey the right, but not the obligation, to purchase
shares in the future at a set price. The shares represented 10%
of all stock in the carrier.45
The Board then demanded more concessions, including an
option to buy up to 33 percent of the stock.46 After America
West agreed, the Board tentatively approved a loan package of
$445 million, of which $380 million to be backed by the Govern-
ment.4 7 The Treasury Department representative dissented. 41
Only one other carrier, Vanguard Airlines, has applied to the
Board.4 9 Vanguard requested a loan package of $60 million.5°'
If the lack of any other applications is an indicator, the other
airlines have apparently viewed the Government's strong hand
as unwelcome. An industry analyst referred to the program as
an option to exercise only "if you are on the rocks. ''5 1 However,
the airlines have generally refrained from commenting, perhaps
knowing that some of them may need to appear before the
Board in 2002 with an application. One commuter airline presi-
dent did obliquely endorse the Government's new intervention-
ist approach, stating that "an activist role in a sick but essential
industry is not necessarily a bad thing."5 2
40 Zuckerman, supra note 37.
41 147 CONG. REC. H5888 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 2001) (statements of Reps. Flake
& Shadegg).
42 News Release 2001-43, Office of Management and Budget, OMB Releases
Regulations for the Air Carrier Guarantee Loan Program (Oct. 5, 2001), at
www.whitehouse.gov/omb/pubpress/2001-43.html.
43 Zuckerman, supra note 37.
44 Zuckerman, supra note 39.
45 Id.
46 Laurence Zuckerman, More Strings on U.S. Deal for Airline, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
29, 2001, at Cl.
47 Id.
48 Id.
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The Act also provides for compensation to air carriers in an
aggregate of $5 billion in grants for losses that are incurred
from the date of the attacks through December 31, 2001 as a
direct result of the terrorist attacks.53 The compensation availa-
ble to each air carrier for the losses incurred after September
11 th and prior to year-end is payable at a maximum of the ratio
of that air carrier's available seat miles for August 2001 to the
total available seat miles of all air carriers for August 2001. 5 4
Thus, the larger the airline's share of seat miles in comparison
to the remainder of the industry, the larger potential payout
available for its proven losses during the specified time period.
A similar method of calculation for losses during this time ap-
plies to air cargo transportation based on revenue ton miles.55
These grants are taxable as gross income.56
This system for allocation of a fixed loss reserve, albeit a sig-
nificant one at $5 billion, spawned some criticism. The almost
certain result will be larger payouts to the six largest carriers -
United, Delta, American, Continental, US Airways, and North-
west - in comparison to smaller carriers. Virtually every carrier,
big and small, was deeply affected by the decline in passenger
revenue miles following the Terrorist Attacks.57 Most carriers
furloughed or laid off many employees.58 One Congressman
criticized the Act as favoring bigger carriers to increase their
likelihood of riding out the storm of September 11th, although
money could have been used for smaller airlines that might have
been healthier before September 11th. 59 Near year-end, $3.8
53 System Stabilization Act, supra note 1, §§ 101 (a) (2), 103.
1 (d. § 103(b)(a)-(2) (A).
55 Id. § 103(b)(1), (2)(B).
56 Id. § 301(b).
57 See Scott McCartney, American Air, Continental Report Losses Total Almost $1
Billion, WALL ST. J., Jan. 17, 2002, at A4. AMR Corporation, parent company of
American Airlines, reported losses of $798 million for the last quarter of 2001.
The company further reported a passenger revenue decline of 31.8%, with busi-
ness travel "down significantly" in the last quarter. The same quarter in 2000
yielded profits for AMR of $47 million. Overall, AMR experienced total losses of
$1.76 billion for 2001, compared with earnings of $813 million for the year 2000.
As a result of these losses, American received $29 million in after-tax income
grants provided for in the Act. Id. Like American, Continental Airlines exper-
ienced significant losses. Continental reported losses of $149 million for the last
quarter of 2001. Continental forecasts that it will lose between $3 and $4 million
per day in the first two months of 2002. In December of 2001, Continental lost
approximately that amount each day. Id.
58 147 CONG. REc. H5885 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 2001) (statements of Reps. Ram-
stad & Hastings).
51 Id. at H5879 (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner).
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billion had been distributed to 115 airlines.6 This included $98
million to America West.6'
The legislation also created certain constraints on employee
compensation as an incentive for the airlines to impose some
internal, fiscally responsible measures.62 From September 11,
2001 to September 11, 2003, no employee of an air carrier that
receives federal credit instruments pursuant to the Act can re-
ceive compensation in any twelve-month period that would ex-
ceed the calendar year 2000 compensation for that employee."
Additionally, any employee with a salary exceeding $300,000
cannot receive a severance pay greater than twice the maximum
total compensation for that employee in calendar year 2000.64
The preservation of regular routes for passengers and cargo is
another subject of protection by the Act. The Act provides the
Secretary of Transportation with authority to require carriers re-
ceiving financial assistance pursuant to the Act to maintain
scheduled air service to any points that were served by that car-
rier before the terrorist attacks.6" Additionally, the Secretary of
Transportation can require air carriers receiving direct financial
assistance under the Act to enter agreements that provide for
scheduled air service to those same communities.6" The Presi-
dent must report to the Congress the financial status of the air
carrier industry on February 1, 2002 and then update over the
same report by April 21, 2002. 7
Title II of the Act sets forth various provisions of relief with
respect to insurance for air carriers. The Secretary can reim-
burse air carriers for increases in premiums on coverage for
risks ending before October 1, 2002 in comparison to premiums
applicable during the week prior to the Terrorist Attacks. 6"8 The
Government agrees to act as if it were an excess insurer by pro-
viding for payment of all damages to third parties in excess of
$100 million, for losses occurring in the 180 days after the pas-
sage of the Act related to acts of terrorism against an air car-
rier.69 Any lawsuit filed for such a future terrorist event will not
G Zuckerman, supra note 37.
61 Id.
62 System Stabilization Act, supra note 1, § 104(a) (2).
63 Id. § 104(a)(1).
(4 Id. § 104(a) (2).
65 Id. § 105(c)(1).
- Id. § 105(c)(2).
67 System Stabilization Act, supra note 1, § 106.
- Id. § 201(b) (1).
69 Id. § 201(b) (2).
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be permitted to include a prayer for punitive damages against
an air carrier.7 °
Title III provides some limited tax relief for airlines with re-
spect to excise taxes.7 1
B. THE FUND
Title IV of the Act provides general ground rules for how
compensation will be made available for victims and their fami-
lies. The Congressional mandate for the Fund has few details:
* Recovery permitted for death and bodily injury, but not psy-
chological injury alone or property damage; 72
* Compensation allowed for virtually all categories of dam-
ages except punitive damages;73
* No cap on damage awards;
* Waiver of the right to sue once a claim is filed;"
* No double recovery via collateral sources. 75
The remaining details for operation of the Fund are left to
the Attorney General for delegation to the Special Master whom
he was directed to appoint.76
1. General Legislative Provisions
The stated purpose of the Fund is to provide compensation to
any individual or the relatives of a deceased individual who was
physically injured or killed as a result of the Terrorist Attacks. 77
Claims are permitted by individuals who were present at one of
the three terrorist attack sites or who were "in the immediate
aftermath" of the Terrorist Attacks and suffered physical harm
or death as a result of the Terrorist Attacks.78 Members of the
flight crews and passengers on the four airline flights are explic-
itly included except for any individual identified by the Attorney
General as a participant or conspirator in the terrorist attacks.7 9
The legislation does not address whether a claimant must be a
citizen of the United States at the time of the Terrorist Attacks.
7. Id. § 405(b) (5).
71 Id. § 301.
72 System Stabilization Act, supra note 1, § 403.
7 Id. §§ 402(5), (7), 405(b) (5).
74 Id. § 405(c) (3) (B) (i).
7-h Id. § 405(b) (6).
76 Id. § 407.
77 System Stabilization Act, supra note 1, § 403.
78 Id. § 405(c)(1)-(2).
79 Id. § 405(c) (2) (B).
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Nor does the legislation require that a claimant have a residency
in the United States at the time of the attacks. This appears to
allow claims by victims who were only visiting the United States
on a legal basis, for business or pleasure, at the time of the Ter-
rorist Attacks. The question of whether a person present in the
United States illegally can recover a compensation award at tax-
payer expense remains unknown.
In order to recover, a claimant is not required to prove negli-
gence against any entity. 8° Compensatory damages are awarded
for economic and non-economic loss, but no claimant is entitled
to seek punitive damages."1 Upon the submission of a claim
form prescribed by the Special Master, a claimant is entitled to
receive economic losses consisting of any pecuniary loss, includ-
ing loss of earnings or other employment benefits, medical ex-
penses, loss of services, burial costs, loss of business and
opportunities, to the extent that recovery for those losses is al-
lowed under the "applicable state law.' '8 2 But the Act does not
define the meaning of "applicable state law." If the Special
Master were to apply any choice of law analysis that results in the
application of damages law from different states or countries,
large disparities could result in the amount of economic loss
damages for similarly situated claimants. As set forth in Section
II.B.2., infra, the Rule employs a method of claims analysis based
on standard award tables, but doubts will remain on state law
application due to a carryover of the "applicable state law" word-
ing into the Rule.
Curiously, the legislation places no similar limitation on the
recovery of non-economic losses.83 Non-economic losses are de-
fined to encompass those intangible losses provided by the most
generous of state wrongful death laws. The Act lists physical and
emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, dis-
figurement, loss of enjoyment of life, loss of society and compan-
ionship, loss of consortium, hedonic damages, injury to
reputation, and any other non-pecuniary losses of any kind as
reasonable non-economic losses.8 4 Few, if any, states in the
United States permit such a broad scope of non-economic losses
in a wrongful death and survival action.
80 d. § 405(b) (2).
8 d. §§ 405(b)(1)(B)(i), 405(b)(5).
82 System Stabilization Act, supra note 1, §§ 405(b)(1)(B)(i), 402(5).
83 Id. § 402(7).
84 Id.
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One of the more controversial sections of the legislation re-
quires the Special Master to reduce each award by the amount
that a claimant has received or is entitled to receive from a col-
lateral source." "Collateral source" is defined broadly to in-
clude "all collateral sources, including life insurance, pension
funds, death benefit programs, and payment by federal, state or
local governments related to the terrorist attacks. ' 86 Arguably,
the inclusion of charitable contributions within that definition
of collateral sources to be deducted from each award was a
source of concern among many claimants and donors to chari-
ties. 7 The Special Master ultimately concluded that the Act left
that issue to his discretion.88
Each claim must be reviewed and the award determined
within 120 days of filing.":' Then, payment must be issued within
twenty days of that determination. 9" No claim can be filed more
than two years after promulgation of the regulations governing
the Fund (i.e. December 21, 2003). 9'
The Act contains a one-sentence provision that reserves to the
Government the right of subrogation for any claim it pays.2
There is little information as to what the Government intends to
do with its powers as a plaintiff, which could include civil suits
against the terrorists or even airline industry defendants. One
commentator suggests that the Government remains interested
in pursuing recovery for itself of terrorist organization assets.93
This potential motive could conflict with those persons who sue
foreign governments and terrorists for damages.94
2. The Rule
The Act requires publication of rules by December 21, 2001
that contain precise specifications for the form for filing a claim,
85 Id. § 405 (b) (6).
- Id. § 402(4).
87 See, e.g., Henriques, supra note 13; Air Transportation Safety and System Sta-
bilization Act, Public Comment No. W000749 (Nov. 1, 2001), available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/victimscompensation/W000749.html.
88 Victim Compensation Fund, supra note 19, at 66,279.
89 System Stabilization Act, supra note 1, § 405(b) (3).
90 Id. § 406(a).
91 Id. § 405(a) (3).
92 See id. § 409.
93 Pamela Falk, Families of Missing Have Three Options, N.Y L.J., Nov. 27, 2001, at
5.
(4 7 Families Sue, supra note 20 (suit against bin Laden, Iran, Iraq, Al Qaeda,
the Taliban, and Zacarias Moussaoui seeks $101 billion in damages).
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information to be submitted by claimants, procedures for hear-
ing and presentation of evidence, procedures to assist claimants
in filing and pursuing claims and the methods to be used in the
determination of awards." Due to the time constraints imposed
by the Act, as well as public pressure to disburse benefits as soon
as possible, the Department did not publish a draft rule for com-
ment.96 The Department noted an exception under the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act for implementation of a benefits
program and concluded that good cause existed to exempt the
rule from the notice of rulemaking and public comment. 97
In lieu of notice and comment, on November 5, 2001, the
Attorney General issued a Notice of Inquiry and Advance Notice
of Rulemaking.98 The Notice provided the public with twenty-
one days to comment on the following six topics:
* Format and content for the claim form;
* Criteria for determining information sufficient to deem a
claim "filed;"
* Procedures for presentation and hearing of evidence, in-
cluding qualifications and authority of hearing officers, record-
ing of hearings, interrogation of witnesses, review by the Special
Master of rulings by hearing officers;
* Assistance to claimants by experts, counsel or other repre-
sentatives and any appropriate fee limitations;
* Eligibility of claimants, including proximity to the crash
sites, threshold of injury for victims, qualifications for and re-
sponsibilities of the personal representative of a decedent;
* Nature of compensation and methods of calculation, in-
cluding use of statistical models to determine economic loss, use
of experts by the Special Master, predicting future income
streams, how state law impacts the analysis, individualizing
awards for noneconomic loss versus standardized values on
losses, defining "collateral sources" that must be deducted from
awards and determining whether a claimant is "entitled" to fu-
ture collateral sources.99
The Attorney General also noted that the Department wel-
comed comments on any other aspect of the Fund.100
95 System Stabilization Act, supra note 1, § 405 (a) (2).
96 Victim Compensation Fund, supra note 19, at 66,280.
97 Id.
98 September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 66 Fed. Reg. 55,901
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The Department received over 800 comments. 101 All were
posted to its website, most with the author's name redacted." 2
Some comments refer to earlier comments of other persons.'0 3
Comments continued to pour in even after the November 26th
deadline. The Department stated that it reviewed all comments
before issuing the interim Final Rule. °4
The comments came from extremely diverse sources. Some
comments were submitted by victims and their families, as well
as by members of the general public.' Other comments were
received from legal counsel for the Governor of New York and
City of New York, Attorney General of Connecticut, and mem-
bers of Congress.0 6 United Airlines and American Airlines, as
well as the Association of Flight Attendants, submitted com-
ments." 7 Additionally, many legal and charitable organizations
provided input, including the American Arbitration Association,
American Bar Association, National Center for Victims of
Crime, Oklahoma Crime Victim Compensation Board, Ameri-
can Civil Liberties Union, Consumers Union and Lambda Legal
Defense and Education Fund.'
A late but significant number of comments were received on a
topic not listed among the six topics in the Attorney General's
Notice. Many persons expressed their belief that the Fund
should compensate unmarried and/or same sex companions of
victims.' 9 Most of these comments appeared in virtually identi-
cal wording, indicating they were likely organized by an interest
group seeking broad support on the issue." 0 Comments subse-
101 Victim Compensation Fund, supra note 19, at 66,288.
102 Id. at 66,276. For a complete review of all comments received, see the De-
partment of Justice's information regarding the Act at http://compensation/.
3 Id.; see, e.g., September l1th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, Public
Comment No. N000369 (Dec. 21, 2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/vic-
timcompensation/interim/N00369.html.





019 E.g., September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, Public Comment
No. A001762 (Dec. 14, 2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensa-
tion/A001762.html (Ensure Parity in Fund Distribution).
110 Eg., id. at Public Comment Nos. A001543 (Dec. 13, 2001), available at
http://www.usdoj/gov/victimcompensation/A001543.html (Implementation of
9/11 Fund) & A001454 (Dec. 11, 2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/vic-
timcompensation/A001454.html (Compensate ALL Victims).
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quently were filed with the opposing view, many also using a
uniform format. 1 '
The Special Master, Kenneth Feinberg, published an "in-
terim" Final Rule ("the Rule") on December 21, 2001 in a timely
fashion under the schedule established by the Act." 2 The Rule
was issued in this manner so that the Department could solicit
comments for an additional thirty days after publication, which
gave them untilJanuary 21, 2002. The Rule appears as Part 104
of Title 28 of the Code of Federal Regulations. A detailed sum-
mary of the public comments is set forth in an appendix to the
Rule.' 13
Comments continued to be received, at least half of which
have addressed to the issue of damage awards to unmarried
companions of decedents. This later surge of proponent letters
appears to be organized by Amnesty International. 1 14 Also, pro-
tests against the collateral source deductions have continued by
victims and members of Congress." 5
Support for awards to the victims has not been unanimous.
Some comments express disappointment, and some even dis-
gust, for the general principle of compensating the victims of
the Terrorist Attacks or for the request by some victims' families
for enhanced compensation.' 16
One article has raised the issue of whether this type of a fund
should be provided for victims of all tragic accidents, not simply
III E.g., id. at Public Comment Nos. N000053 (Dec. 20, 2001), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/N00053.html (Are Homosexual
Marriages Legal in New York or Washington, D.C.?) & N000370 (Dec. 21, 2001),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/N000370.html (Protect
Traditional Marriage).
112 28 C.F.R. pt. 104.
113 Victim Compensation Fund, supra note 19, at 66,287-291.
114 E.g. September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, Public Comment
No. N000372 (Dec. 21, 2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensa-
tion/N000372.html (Relief).
l1 Elissa Gootman, In Last Days for Comment, Victims' Fund is Under Fire, N.Y.
TiMES, Jan. 7, 2002, at B4; see, e.g., September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of
2001, Public Comment No. 001564 (Jan. 11, 2002).
116 E.g., September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, Public Comment
Nos. N000411 Dec. 21, 2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensa-
tion/N000411.html (Compensation for the 9/11 Victim Families), N000404
(Dec. 21, 2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/
N000404.html, N000392 (Dec. 21, 2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/vic-
timcompensation/N000392.html (Lucky to Get Anything), & N000375 (Dec. 21,
2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/N000375.html
(Compensation).
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the Terrorist Attacks. 1 7 The need to begin accepting claims on
December 21st necessitated publishing rules that may not have
been as fully digested and widely accepted as would have been
preferred.
A Final Rule, published on March 13, 2002 made very few
changes to the existing interim Final Rule.
a. Claimant Eligibility
The Rule includes as eligible claimants the basic affected clas-
ses: i) persons on the four flights (other than terrorists and con-
spirators); and ii) persons injured or killed at the three crash
sites.1 ' The Rule imposes multiple criteria for persons in those
two groups before the threshold for recovery is satisfied. 1I The
Rule does not resolve explicitly the controversy over recovery by
unmarried and same-sex partners of victims. With respect to in-
jured claimants, many may not be able to satisfy the stringent
criteria.
First, recovery is limited to those persons who sustained death
or injury in the "immediate aftermath" of the Terrorist At-
tacks. 120 This term is defined as the twelve hours following the
Terrorist Attacks for all claimants, except for rescue workers
who assisted in efforts to search for and recover victims.' 2' That
group can file claims for injuries sustained within 96 hours after
the crashes. 122
Second, the person must have sustained "physical harm" as
defined by the Rule. 12 The physical harm requirement means
three elements must be satisfied: i) a "physical injury to the
body"; ii) treatment by a medical professional up to 72 hours of
injury or rescue; and iii) hospitalization as an in-patient for at
least 24 hours or at least partial physical disability, incapacity or
disfigurement on a temporary or permanent basis. 124 Addition-
ally, contemporaneous medical records made by or at the direc-
tion of the medical professional that provided the medical care
must verify the physical injury.
117 Peter H. Schuck, Equity for All Victims, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2001, at A35.
-lS 28 C.F.R. § 104.2(a).
119 Id. § 104.2.
120 Id. § 104.2(a).
121 Id. § 104.2(b).
122 Id.
123 28 C.F.R. § 104.2(a)(1).
124 Id. § 104.2(c).
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This second element appears to exclude an entire class of per-
sons, perhaps quite large in number, who sustained psychologi-
cal trauma as a result of being in the immediate vicinity of the
Terrorist Attacks and who have been treated by mental health
professionals as a result. 125 The thousands of persons evacuated
from the Pentagon or the two World Trade Center towers and
adjacent buildings, who witnessed one or more of the crash of
the aircraft, the collapse of the towers, people jumping from the
towers, and other horrific sights, will not be eligible for compen-
sation from the Fund. The legislative history does not shed light
on the basis for this decision. Credit must be given to the Spe-
cial Master for addressing this restriction candidly in the Rule so
that potential claimants are not misled into foregoing a tort
claim despite the impossibility of recovery from the Fund.
126
Whether claimants will try to assert that a psychological injury
has a physical component remains to be seen.
Third, the victim must have been "present at the site" of one
of the three crashes. 12v The Rule defines the proximity as either
the buildings or portions of buildings destroyed by the crashes
or any area contiguous to the sites that the Special Master deter-
mines was sufficiently close to present a risk of physical harm
from impact, fire, explosions, or building collapses. 2  The lat-
ter condition is further explained as "the immediate area in
which the impact occurred, fire occurred, portions of buildings
fell, or debris fell upon and injured persons."'129
A victim killed in the Terrorist Attacks must have an approved
"personal representative" pursue a claim for them. 3 " The Rule
identifies a hierarchy of persons who will be permitted to file a
claim for a decedent: first, the person appointed by a court of
competent jurisdiction to serve as Personal Representative or as
executor/administrator of the estate; if no such appointee ex-
ists, within the discretion of the Special Master, the person
named in the will as the executor/administrator of the estate; if
125 Victim Compensation Fund, supra note 19, at 66,276 ("Congress did not intend for
this Fund to compensate those who suffered only emotional harm. ) (emphasis
added).
126 Id.
127 28 C.F.R. § 104.2(a).
128 Id. § 104.2(e)(1), (2).
1"2 Id.
130 Id. §§ 104.2(a)(2),(3), 104.4(d).
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no will exists, the person first in line of succession per the law
governing intestacy of the decedent's, domicile.13'
A Personal Representative must serve written notice of inten-
tion to file a claim using the form designated by the Rule before
filing a claim with the Fund. 3 2 The written notice must be
served personally or by certified mail on the immediate family,
executor/administrator, and all persons who reasonably could
be expected to claim damages related to the wrongful death of
the decedent.133 Objections must then be filed within thirty
days to create a "dispute," which the Rule states will not be re-
solved by the Special Master.'3 4 He may suspend adjudication
pending resolution by a court, value the claim, and place the
award in escrow, or proceed if the disputing claimants can agree
to a temporary personal representative. 35
b. Two Tracks to Awards
Once they submit the requisite claim forms that have been
published as part of the Rule, the Rule provides claimants with
two options or "tracks."'3 6 The only meaningful distinction is
that a hearing is optional with one track and automatic with the
other.137 Under Track A, a claims evaluator determines eligibil-
ity and the award made pursuant to the "presumptive award
methodology" described at Section II.B.2.c., infra, or a determi-
nation that the claimant is ineligible.3 8 The claimant can either
accept the award or demand a hearing before the Special
Master or his designee. 3 9
Under Track B, the claims evaluator communicates only eligi-
bility to the claimant, who then proceeds automatically to a
hearing. 4 ° At that time, the claimant is advised of the amount
of an award. The claimant can seek a modification but will not
obtain a revised award unless he or she shows "extraordinary
circumstances" not adequately addressed by the standardized
damages tables.' 4'
131 Id. § 104.4(a).
132 28 C.F.R. § 104.4(b).
133 Id.
134 Id. § 104.4(c).
135 Id. § 104.4(d).
I- Id. § 104.31(b).
137 28 C.F.R. § 104.31(b).
118 Id. § 104.31(b)(1).
139 Id.
140 Id. § 104.31(b)(2).
141 Id.
2002] A BILL FOR THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 161
Once the claimant receives notice of an award (Track A) or
eligibility (Track B), a supplemental submission can be filed in a
form provided by the Special Master. 4 2 A hearing is requested
(or held automatically with Track B) to permit the claimant or
his designee to present evidence or information relevant to a
full understanding of the claim.' 43 Counsel can, but need not
be, retained. 44 A claimant can also present expert witnesses,
who can be subject to "review of credentials" and questioning by
the Special Master or his designee.14 5 The claimant may choose
whether the hearing is open to the public or private.' 46 Hear-
ings are expected to run approximately two hours but no cut-off
will be imposed.' 47
Following the hearing, a final award is rendered. 48 No writ-
ten record of deliberations must be created or provided to the
claimant. 49 No review or appeal lies from this final determina-
tion of award.' 5 ° The amounts of awards may be published for
guidance to prospective claimants, but the names of claimants
and victims will remain confidential.' 51 Given the stated goal of
publication, it can be assumed that publication of awards will
include a summary of the claimant's circumstances.
c. "Presumptive" Economic Loss for Decedents
The Rule requires the creation of loss tables with standard
awards for economic losses, depending on the age, number of
dependents, spouse, and income of the deceased victims. 52
These "Presumed Loss" tables will not automatically be used for
injured claimants.' 53 The tables were published simultaneously
with the Rule on December 21st and have created a major point
of contention with claimants. 5
4
By creating the tables, the Special Master attempted to tread
the fine line between two competing interests: considering the
142 28 C.F.R. § 104.33(a).
144 Id. § 104.33(b).
144 Id. § 104.33(d).
145 Id.
146 Id. § 104.33(c).
.47 28 C.F.R. § 104.33(c).
148 Id. § 104.33(g).
149 Id.
15o Id.
151 Id. § 104.34.
152 28 C.F.R. §104.43(o).
153 Id. § 104.45(a).
154 E.g., Gootman, supra note 115.
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"individual circumstances" of each claim and avoiding disparity
of awards between "similarly situated" claimants. The first con-
cern is required by the Act. The second is the stated intention
of the Special Master.' 5
5
How individualized a review process Congressional legislators
anticipated, they did not disclose. By requiring the review and
processing of each claim within 120 days of filing, the Act does
not afford substantial time for the Special Master to truly indi-
vidualize his review of what will likely total thousands of
claims.' 56 The Congressional priority of expediency, desirable
under the circumstances for many claimants, inevitably sacri-
ficed what might have been a more detailed review process.
The Special Master, on the other hand, presented an intro-
ductory statement in the Rule that stresses the potential inequity
of grossly disparate financial awards. Indeed, he states outright
that awards exceeding $3 million "will rarely be appropriate,"
regardless of whether the income of the decedent would other-
wise support greater numbers under the general methodology
employed for computation of economic losses. 57 He concludes
that awards based solely on replication of future income streams
might be excessive relative to the needs of these claimants and
insufficient relative to the needs of others. 15  On the other
hand, he has set a baseline award, before collateral source de-
ductions, of $300,000 for victims without dependents and
$500,000 for those with dependents.' 59 The Final Rule notes
that economic loss awards will rarely fall below $250,000.
Whether these two interests can be reconciled will depend on
how claims and claimants are treated by the Special Master and
his staff. The process must actually afford claimants the review
they deserve, as well as convey to them that such a process is in
fact occurring. Emotions will run high with families determined
to maximize compensation from, what will be for many, the only
chance to recover damages from any source. The likelihood of
many families successfully availing themselves of the option also
to sue the terrorist perpetrators is sufficiently remote that they
will view the Fund as the only realistic opportunity to recover
damages.
55 Victim Compensation Fund, supra note 19, at 66,278. "In principle, similarly
situated claimants should not receive dramatically differing treatment." Id.
156 System Stabilization Act, supra note 1, § 405(b) (3).
157 Victim Compensation Fund, supra note 19, at 66,274-75.
158 Id.
1-9 28 C.F.R. § 104.41.
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The use of Presumed Loss tables, as a benchmark but not an
absolute, may prove to be a wise choice for providing predict-
ability to these claimants. Representatives of decedents must
know the approximate award before they file a claim with the
Fund and forego a lawsuit. 60 There simply is no other way to
provide every claimant with an estimate of his or her award.
The Presumed Loss tables were created through a five-step
process.161 Claims will be analyzed using the same steps, with
the tables as a guide:
1. The potential pre-tax total compensation of victims for
1998-2000 was considered, including some fringe benefits such
as medical premiums. 162 The Rule states that the three years of
compensation for actual claimants might be averaged if the Spe-
cial Master finds it to be appropriate. 161 (Alternatively, the high-
est year or the most recent year could be used.) The income is
then reduced by the amount of taxes that would have been paid
pursuant to the law of victim's domicile.164 If the victim's com-
pensation was higher than the 98th percentile of wage earners
(i.e. exceeded $225,000), the final column of the loss table is
still used. 65 This means the claim award will be calculated using
an effective presumed award for a salary of $225,000, despite the
claimant having earned multiples of that amount per year.
2. The presumed income stream is increased annually for in-
flation and merit raises, assuming rates of 6.6 percent annually
for persons less than age 30, 5.1 percent for persons age 31 to
50, and 4.2 percent for persons over age 50.166 The calculations
are based on actuarial data analysis.
161
3. The years of remaining work life are calculated using
Worklife Estimates published by the U.S. Department of Labor,
Bureau of Statistics based on gender and age at time of death.
168
160 Victim Compensation Fund, supra note 19, at 66,278.
161 U.S. Dep't of justice, September I1th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001,
Presumed Economic and Non-Economic Loss Tables, § II.A.I., available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/vc-matrices.pdf [hereinafter Presumed Eco-
nomic Loss Tables]
162 28 C.F.R. § 104.43(a).
163 Id.
164 Presumed Economic Loss Tables, supra note 161, at Step One.
165 Id.
166 Id. at Step Two.
167 Id.
-6 Id. at Step Three.
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4. The award is reduced to present value using a rate of 5.13
percent per annum on an investment of the principle. 169 The
Rule states that the rate is equivalent to a long-term, risk-free
rate of return on investment.
5. The award is reduced for consumption, depending on the
number and age of dependents. Consumption will be limited to
certain Bureau of Labor Statistics items, such as food, clothing,
and transportation. 70
Families of victims who were retired or not employed will be
compensated based on the value of replacement services."'
This is not defined but appears to reference household services.
Awards for persons with less than three years of employment will
be calculated on an individual basis. 7 2 Economic loss for mi-
nors may be based on average incomes for all wage earners. 7 1
The problem of creating just the right balance between actual
loss and "equitable" awards is further complicated by the limita-
tion in the Act that economic loss will be awarded only to the
extent allowed under "applicable" State law. 174 Which state law
applies is not defined by the Act. The limitation is reiterated by
the Rule and could result in significant limitations on awards to
some classes of claimants. 171 According to the Rule, "the Special
Master is not permitted to compensate claimants for those cate-
gories or types of economic losses that would not be compensa-
ble under the law of the state that would be applicable to any
tort claims brought by or on behalf of the victim."'
7 6
The largest group of claimants affected by the "applicable"
state law constraint will probably be those seeking recovery on
behalf of unmarried persons, with no dependents, domiciled in
New York. If New York law were to govern their prospective tort
claims, very little money would be awarded for lost income of
the decedent because financial dependency of immediate family
members is required. 77 Conversely, the Presumed Loss tables
169 Presumed Economic Loss Tables, supra note 161, at Step Four.
170 Id.
171 28 C.F.R. § 104.43(c).
172 Presumed Economic Loss Tables, supra note 161, § I.
.17 28 C.F.R. § 104.43(a).
174 System Stabilization Act, supra note 1, §§ 405(b) (1) (B) (i), 402(5).
17. See 28 C.F.R. § 104.42.
176 id.
177 N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRusIs § 5-4.3(a) (Consol. 2001); see also id. § 4-1.1.
164
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provide for economic loss awards as high as $2,278,000 for a
decedent in those circumstances.1
78
d. Economic Loss for Survivor Claims
Survivor claims will not necessarily be based upon the Pre-
sumed Loss tables.179 The Rule provides for review on a case-by-
case basis or use, of the tables with appropriate modifications.""'
The Special Master will make determinations on length of and
extent of disability based upon government and insurance com-
pany reports and medical records.1 8 ' The Rule is silent as to
whether an award can be issued for a disability caused entirely
or in part by a psychological injury to a person who also sus-
tained a physical injury. The wording of the Rule does not fore-
close that option. l
2
e. Noneconomic Loss Awards
The Rule requires a predetermined award for every decedent
at $250,000 plus an additional $100,000 for a spouse and for
each dependent.'83 This set amount of an award applies regard-
less of the crash site involved, whether the decedent was a pas-
senger in an aircraft or a person on the ground, whether
presumed to have died instantaneously or proven to have died
well after the relevant crash." 4 The Rule addresses this issue by
noting that individual circumstances of death are unknown in
most situations, and public comment supported a uniform ap-
proach to this component of compensation. 8 5 Survivors are en-
titled to noneconomic losses on a case-by-case basis based on the
grants for decedents adjusted to their circumstances." 6 For
those who survived the Pentagon and World Trade Center at-
tacks, an award of $250,000 could be quite low in comparison to
expectations.
178 Presumed Economic Loss Tables, supra note 161, at Table For A Single Dece-
dent Before Any Collateral Offset.
179 28 C.F.R. § 104.45(a).
180 Id.
181 Id. § 104.45(a)(1)-(3).
182 See id.
183 Id. § 104.44.
184 28 C.F.R. § 104.44.
185 Victim Compensation Fund, supra note 19, at 66,279.
186 28 C.F.R. § 104.46.
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f. Collateral Source Deductions
The Rule provides for the deduction of "all" collateral sources
as required by the Act. 8 7 As stated above, survivors are entitled
to noneconomic losses on a case-by-case basis based on the
grants for decedents adjusted to their circumstances.'8 8 The is-
sue of importance to every claimant on this topic was whether
the Rule would require the deduction of charitable donations to
a claimant or the family of a deceased victim. The Special
Master ultimately held that those contributions would not be
considered as part of the deductions for each claimant.'8 9 He
also has excluded savings accounts and 401 (k) plans.
The Appendix to the Rule notes that most comments agreed
with the decision not to deduct, while some comments favored
deduction of charitable donations.' 9° The rationale for the for-
mer group was a concern that people will not contribute to
charities if they believe that the recipients are somehow penal-
ized for receiving a donation.' 9 ' Those in favor of a setoff for
charitable deductions were concerned at windfalls for surviving
families and a decline in donations as a result. 192
The continuing debate over other collateral source deduc-
tions is focused on the Rule and the Special Master. However,
Congress appears to have limited his authority to refuse setoffs
for life insurance and other deductions by expressly stating in
the Act that these deductions must be made. The public debate
has not been focused to any extent on amending the Act, which
could conclusively resolve this problem.
g. Attorneys Fees
The Rule does not set any limit on the contingency fee that a
lawyer can charge a claimant. In the opening statement, the
Special Master does express his view that fees providing more
than five percent of an award would generally be excessive."'
Claimants need not hire an attorney in order to file a claim for
the Fund." 4 Indeed, the House of Representatives considered
in passing the Act that the Association of Trial Lawyers of
187 Id. § 104.47(a).
- Id. § 104.46.
189 Id.
190 Victim Compensation Fund, supra note 19, at 66,290.
19" Id.
192 Id.
193 Id. at 66,280.
194 28 C.F.R. § 104.33(d).
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America offered to provide free legal services for claimants to
the Fund, enabling 100 percent of Fund awards to assist the fam-
ilies of the victims. 95 In light of these facts, the Special Master
concluded that the input that a claimant might receive from
counsel would not warrant fees of up to thirty-three percent or
more. Public comment on the issue was split.'96
C. LIMITATION ON LAWSUITS
The airlines are faced with the unenviable circumstance of
fighting a war on two fronts. Not only must they battle for sur-
vival following decreased revenues from a lower volume of pas-
senger seat miles, but they must also prepare for the lawsuits
that will inevitably result from the Terrorist Attacks.19 7 The loss
of revenues, while potentially devastating to the corporations as
well as employees, is likely a temporary situation. Business trav-
elers in particular must move 4tbout the country and the world,
and the airlines can take steps to preserve capital (albeit harsh
steps of layoffs or furloughs of personnel) while they await the
return of their customers to pre-September 11th levels.
Lawsuits pose a different risk. If insurance policy limits are
exhausted by repeated lawsuits, no amount of financial hedging
or planning can remedy the verdict that exceeds an airline's cov-
erage by tens of millions of dollars. Those claimants who
choose litigation will undoubtedly file punitive damage claims.
In jurisdictions that do not permit the inclusion of a punitive
damage prayer in the Complaint, motions to plead a count for
punitive damages will follow. The prospect of a verdict for sev-
eral million dollars compensatory damages and several hundred
million dollars in punitive damages is a sobering one indeed for
corporations that have been losing money daily for the past sev-
eral months.
1. Capping Industry Exposure
The Act addresses this risk in the form of financial protection
at the courthouse. The Act limits the exposure of an airline for
the aggregate of all lawsuits related to the Terrorist Attacks to
195 147 CONG. REc. H5914 (Sept. 21, 2001) (statement of Leo V. Boyle, Presi-
dent, Association of Trial Lawyers of America).
196 Victim Compensation Fund, supra note 19, at 66,291.
197 See, e.g., Reuters, United Hit With Wrongful Death Suit, Widow of Passenger on
Sept. 11-hijacked Jet Takes Action (Dec. 20, 2001), available at http://www.msnbc.
com/news/675826.asp.
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the limits of its liability insurance. 19 Although the airlines most
likely to face lawsuits are United Airlines and American Airlines,
each of which had two aircraft commandeered as part of the
Terrorist Attacks, the Act does not protect only those two
airlines."'9
Subsequent legislation in November 2001 expanded the
scope of protection to not only airlines, but also to airports, air-
craft manufacturers, and other potential targets of claimants.
The Aviation and Transportation Security Act ("Security Act") is
another example of accelerated legislative response to the Ter-
rorist Attacks.2 z ... The Security Act mandates changes in airport
security by establishing ownership criteria for the companies
that screen passengers and baggage, citizenship and training cri-
teria for the personnel working the security posts, and specifica-
tions for the machines that will be used to inspect checked
baggage.2°11 The Security Act was introduced in the Senate on
September 21, 2001, passed by both houses of Congress on No-
vember 16th and signed by the President on November 19,
2001.
The final section of the second piece of legislation includes a
short provision revising the Act to expand the scope of aviation
industry entities protected from lawsuits.2 °2 The Security Act
amends Section 408 of the Act to include "airport sponsors" as
another class of entities exempt from judgments that exceed in-
surance policy limits. 203 This term means "the owner or opera-
tor of an airport.212 4 Aircraft manufacturers, defined as entities
that manufactured any aircraft used in the Terrorist Attacks or
parts and components thereof, have similarly limited liability. 20 5
The property owners of the World Trade Center and all other
persons with a property interest in the complex are included. 20 6
Finally, exposure for the City of New York is capped at $350 mil-
lion or the limits of its liability insurance, whichever is greater.2 7
111 System Stabilization Act, supra note 1, § 408(a).
I' ) See id.
200o See Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat.
597 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.) [hereinafter Security
Act].
201 Id.
202 Id. § 201.
2(13 Id. § 201(b) (2) (a) (1).
204 Id. § 201 (d) (4).
20o5 Security Act, supra note 200, §§ 201 (d) (3), 201 (b) (2) (a) (1).
206 Id. § 201(b)(2)(a)(1).
207 Id. § 201 (b) (2) (a) (3).
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Moreover, the Security Act included wording not in the origi-
nal Act that protects the carriers, airports, and manufacturers
from contribution and indemnity claims. 20 8 This provides an ad-
ditional layer of protection in the event any entity that is sued
considers filing a third party action based in tort or contract.
Noticeably absent from the protections of the Act or the revi-
sions of the Security Act are the airport security companies.
They remain open to lawsuits that could bankrupt any of those
companies involved in screening the flights involved in the Ter-
rorist Attacks or the preceding connecting flights used by the
terrorists. No doubts exist as to the legislative intent concerning
the absence of security firms from the list of protected classes of
aviation-related companies. The Security Act explicitly pre-
serves an aggrieved party's right of action against security com-
panies by stating that the limits on liability do not apply to those
entities and by noting that the term "air carrier" does not en-
compass a security company.20 9
Why the change in approach by Congress and the President
to the potential liability of aviation companies for losses arising
from air crashes? A crash of a commercial passenger flight is a
devastating event, not only for the passengers and crew, but also
in terms of financial impact. Yet, when air crashes of commer-
cial flights have occurred, the Government has no history of in-
tervening to protect airlines or other companies in the aviation
industry from uninsured exposure.
Unlike the lawsuits spawned by prior aviation accidents that
most major airlines have experienced, the Terrorist Attacks
brought the prospect of a crushing blow to the balance sheet of
an airline. The crash of each aircraft resulted in deaths and in-
juries to far greater numbers of persons on the ground in com-
parison to the passengers and crew. The total persons killed
and injured numbered in the thousands, not in the hundreds as
with prior crashes.
United Airlines and American Airlines reportedly have $1.5
billion in liability insurance coverage for passenger bodily injury
and death claims and property damage claims for each aircraft
that was hijacked and crashed. 210 Those limits would usually be
sufficient to indemnify the airline for compensatory damages
208 Id. § 201(b) (2) (a) (1).
2- Id. § 201(b) (3).
210 Lee S. Kreindler, Pros and Cons of Victims'Fund, Compensation May Bring Sal-
vation or Frustration, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 27, 2001, at 5.
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judgments and settlements resulting from passenger and by-
stander claims due to an accident. For the Shanksville crash,
$1.5 billion is very likely sufficient to compensate the estates of
the passengers. The Pentagon crash involved 125 persons killed
on the ground in addition to the passengers on the aircraft,
making policy limits possibly sufficient for claims. In the case of
the World Trade Center crashes, a total of $3.0 billion is likely to
be grossly inadequate.
At year-end, a total of 2940 persons are presumed dead from
that attack, including 147 on the two flights. The estates of
these victims could all feasibility file suit against United and
American, seeking compensatory and punitive damages. Many
more were injured in the evacuation and collapse of the towers.
The leaseholders of the WTC could also sue, or their insurers
could sue in subrogation, for the destruction of the two towers
and other buildings in the complex. All of the affected busi-
nesses in the buildings destroyed or damaged by the two crashes
and collapse of the two towers might also sue the two airlines.
While proximate cause becomes increasingly tenuous, the list
does not stop there. Local businesses that have lost revenues or
gone bankrupt, and their creditors, may also line up at the
county clerk office to file suit. Nearby apartment occupants and
workers, many of whom did not sustain tangible bodily injury,
may seek damages for their fear of living or working near the
site.
The computations for all of these potential damages or just
the damages that would flow from the more feasible causes of
action, puts the $3.0 billion in indemnity coverage into perspec-
tive. Those limits, impressive in the abstract, would be ex-
hausted before the battle is truly joined. In stepped Congress
and the President to rescue an industry or at least some part of
it, from financial ruin.
2. More Rules
If a claimant chooses to sue an airline, airport, security com-
pany, or other entity for damages caused by the Terrorist At-
tacks, the options usually available, as part of litigation strategy,
have been severely limited. Congress federalized the cause of
action for damages relating to the Terrorist Attacks by vesting
jurisdiction exclusively within the federal courts.2 1 Venue is
limited to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
211 System Stabilization Act, supra note 1, § 408(b) (1).
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New York.2 12 That court must apply the substantive law, includ-
ing choice of law rules, of the state where the air crash
occurred.219
The constraints imposed by the Act will preclude claimants
from suing the airlines or possibly other entities in the jurisdic-
tion where they reside, which might have provided a more sym-
pathetic jury. Plaintiffs also will not be permitted to file suit in
jurisdictions known for higher verdict awards, which often in-
volves filing suit in state court. These options have been availa-
ble in many aviation accidents because major carriers are subject
to personal jurisdiction in most states based on their routes. De-
fendants often remove the state court actions to federal court if
possible, and the federal court cases are typically consolidated
for discovery purposes through the Multidistrict Litigation pro-
cess. 2  Nonetheless, that system provides plaintiffs options that
might give them some leverage in the procedural posture of the
case.
These legal constraints have already been applied. An insur-
ance coverage dispute between the leaseholder of the World
Trade Center and certain insurers of that property was filed on
November 5, 2001 in the Southern District of New York.21  The
first estate to sue for a wrongful death arising out of the Terror-
ist Attacks commenced that case on December 20, 2002.216 The
case was filed by a New Hampshire resident against United Air-
lines in the Southern District of New York for a passenger on a
flight that struck the World Trade Center.217
Despite the national call for restraint on filing suit as a result
of the Terrorist Attacks, four additional lawsuits were filed
against American Airlines, United Airlines, and airport security
companies. 21- Each new suit was filed in the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of New York, the required forum
under the Act.
212 Id. § 408(b) (3).
213 Id. § 408(b) (2).
214 See, e.g., In reAir Crash Off Point Mugu, Cal. on Jan. 30, 2000, 145 F. Supp.
2d 1156 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (crash of Alaska Airlines Flight on January 30, 2000).
215 World Trade Ctr. Props. L.L.C. v. Ace Berm. Ins. Ltd., No. 01 CIV. 9781
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 2001).
216 Reuters, supra note 197.
217 Id.
218 William Glaberson, A Nation Challenged: Civil Actions; 4 Suits Filed, Despite Call
For Restraint by Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, jan. 15, 2002, at A13.
2002]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
III. THE VERY SHORT HISTORY OF THE LEGISLATION
The Act made its way from pen to paper to the President's
desk in record time. How much forethought went into a short
bill, with few amendments that will cost the American taxpayers
upwards of $25 billion over the next few years? The legislative
history is very brief but does provide some insight into the moti-
vations for the Act.
The bill was introduced in the House as H.R. 2926 on Septem-
ber 21, 2001.219 Written legislative history exists on floor debate
when H.R. 242 and 244 were called for votes. Those procedural
resolutions required a vote on the Act with no amendments and
permitted very limited debate.2 ° Some criticized the excessive
urgency to vote on the bill that day.22' The procedural votes
both passed.2 2
One proponent of the Act noted that the Dow Jones Indus-
trial Average had dropped 1200 points that week and that banks
were closely watching Congress for action in anticipation of pos-
sibly refusing to extend airline credit.223 A comparison to the
Chrysler bailout was made by a few speakers as an example of
how Government funding of a corporate rescue can be advanta-
geous for the company, its workers and taxpayers.224 An equity
position in airlines that receive Government backed loans was
praised to protect the taxpayers.
Support for the Act was far from unanimous. One major criti-
cism of the bill was the lack of immediate protection for jobs of
airline industry personnel and those in related businesses that
depend on a healthy industry for their work. 6 Since the Act
has a specific provision concerning a freeze on salaries above
$300,000, multimillion-dollar salaries became a lightning rod for
criticism of the Act. Words like "obscene" were used to describe
a companion provision allowing severance pay within specified
limits for officers of airlines that accept Government assistance,
219 H.R. 2926, 107th Cong. (2001).
22,) 147 CONG. REc. H5875 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 2001) (statement of Rep. Reyn-
olds); id. at H5884 (statement of Rep. Reynolds).
221 Id. at H5882 (statement of Rep. Doggett).
222 d. at H5883, H5893.
223 Id. at H5877 (statement of Rep. Foley).
224 147 CONG. REC. H5878 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 2001) (statement of Rep. Foley).
225 Id. at H5881 (statement of Rep. Bentsen).
2216 Id. at H5877 (statement of Rep. Obey); id. at H5880 (statements of Reps.
Waxman & Sanders); id. at H5889 (statements of Reps. Brown & Brady); id. at
H5890 (statements of Reps. Schakowsky & Udall).
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despite the bill addressing private corporations for which issues
like executive compensation are generally not an item of con-
cern for the Government. 227 A letter from the AFL-CIO presi-
dent was quoted as another basis to delay the vote and take
more time for committee meetings. 228 One representative sug-
gested that the American people do not care about the solvency
of the airlines.229
The legislators did not spend much time addressing the Fund.
Some did express concern that victims of other disasters and at-
tacks, including Oklahoma City, did not receive similar treat-
ment. 230 One Representative voiced opposition to an open-
ended program where families of those victims who earned
large salaries could prove and recover losses in the millions of
dollars, and expressed frustration at the procedural bar from
offering an amendment with a damages cap.23'
The issue of security for passengers was raised repeatedly as a
more immediate concern that would not be addressed by the
Act.23 2 The House Speaker and Minority Leader promised their
respective legislative constituencies that a bill to enhance secur-
ity would follow in short order.233 The bill that ultimately be-
came the Security Act was introduced that same day in the
Senate.234
A motion to recommit the Act back to committee was made
for purposes of including two amendments. 235 One proposed
section of the Act would have required airlines to pay eighteen
months of health insurance premiums for employees laid off in
the two years following the Terrorist Attacks by using some of
the Government funding. A second provision would have re-
quired the use of FAA personnel to screen all bags and passen-
227 147 CONG. REc. H5880 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 2001) (statement of Rep.
Waxman).
228 Id. at H5879 (statement of Rep. Filner).
22 Id. at H5876 (statement of Rep. George Miller).
230 Id. at H5879 (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner).
231 Id. at H5892 (statement of Rep. Spratt).
232 147 CONG. REc. H5876 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 2001) (statement of Rep.
DeFazio); id. at H5882 (statement of Rep. Doggett); id. at H5892 (statement of
Rep. DeLauro).
233 Id. at H5910.
234 S. 1447, 107th Cong. (2001).
235 147 CONG. REc. H5915 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 2001) (statement of Rep.
DeFazio).
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gers as soon as possible. The motion to recommit was
rejected.236
The House passed the Act on a 356 to 54 vote that same eve-
ning of September 21st, and a companion bill was passed in the
Senate on a 96 to 1 vote the same day.237 President Bush signed
the Act into law on September 22, 2001.
IV. IS THE FUND THE BEST CHOICE FOR CLAIMANTS?
Claimants must determine whether they wish to seek recovery
from the Fund or pursue damages through litigation. The Act
requires that a claimant forego any lawsuit once a claim is filed
with the Fund.23 8 The Rule requires that any lawsuit must be
withdrawn no later than March 21, 2002 or the claimant will not
be permitted to file a claim with the Fund.239
The Presumed Loss Tables should help guide claimants
through that decision-making process. Of course, the inability
of a claimant to seek both recovery from the Fund and recovery
via a lawsuit means that some doubt will always exist as to
whether the choice of pursuing litigation would have resulted in
a larger monetary recovery or some other form of less tangible
satisfaction. However, it is unlikely that any claimant will be sat-
isfied with recovery from the Fund, regardless of the amount, if
the claimant does not appreciate the carefully chosen admoni-
tion by the Special Master in the introduction to the Rule.
In his opening statement, the Special Master describes the
Fund as a "no-fault alternative to tort litigation. "240 The choice
of words is accurate and descriptive. The Fund will not and
should not constitute a replication of the court system. The
Fund will accomplish precisely the opposite, alleviating the con-
tentiousness for claimants that inevitably occurs when a plaintiff
pursues a high value claim in a very public forum.
Consequently, claimants will not observe in the claim process
of the Fund most of the typical attributes of a litigation claim.
There will be no juries that can sympathize with their plight or
the potential for damage awards that can reach into the tens of
millions of dollars for compensatory damages, perhaps multiple
of that sum for punitive damages. They will have an opportunity
236 Id. at H5917.
237 S. 1450, 107th Cong. (2001).
238 System Stabilization Act, supra note 1, § 405(c) (3) (B) (i).
239 28 C.F.R. § 104.61(b).
240 Victim Compensation Fund, supra note 19, at 66,275.
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to address the Special Master or his designee on the scope of
damages but not in the public forum that a high profile trial
affords to air those concerns before a much wider audience.
Some have criticized the Special Master for refusing to award
damages of tens of millions of dollars for certain highly paid
victims. One commentator even suggested that Congress re-
quired awards of that magnitude, as if rendered by a jury, by its
"applicable state law" wording in the Act.24' These comments
and similar criticisms ignore the decision made by the Congress
in passing this legislation. Congress could have, but did not, al-
low claimants to file suit against whomever they believe culpa-
ble, proceed to verdict before a jury and have the Government
pay the judgment. That process would have created awards that
would most closely resemble lawsuits against defendants. In-
stead, Congress created a more limited vehicle for recovery.
Moreover, the Act specifically notes that there will be no
need, nor a right, to prove negligence against any entity in the
process of submitting a claim to the Fund.242 Some claimants
may understandably prefer to pursue from a tribunal a finding
of liability against some entity for the death of their family mem-
bers. A claimant may also desire a jury verdict for a number of
reasons, including vindication of the rights of the decedent or
punishment of the wrongdoer. Obviously, pursuing recovery
through the Fund will not achieve that goal. The Special Master
has noted that the Fund is intended as a process that will be
non-adversarial in nature and will deal strictly with the appropri-
ate quantum of damages for claimants.243
If claimants bear these purposes of the Fund in mind as they
proceed with a claim, many claimants will likely conclude that
filing a claim with the Fund was a wise choice. The following
analysis compares awards from the Fund and the potential for
an award by verdict from a jury.
A. TYPICAL RECOVERIES FROM THE FUND
The two alternatives for claimants begin with reviewing the
potential damages that two typical claimants would recover from
the Fund, before collateral source deductions. The most signifi-
241 Lee S. Kreindler, WTC Compensation; A Sad Disappointment, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 4,
2002.
242 System Stabilization Act, supra note 1, § 405(b)(2). "[T]he Special Master
shall not consider negligence or any other theory of liability." Id.
243 Victim Compensation Fund, supra note 19, at 66,274.
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cant distinction is dependents of a decedent. This article re-
views two hypothetical domiciliaries of New York employed at
the World Trade Center.
First, consider the expected recovery from the Fund for a
claimant representing a single decedent who was age 35 at the
time of the Terrorist Attacks, earning $100,000 per year, with no
dependents. The Presumed Loss Tables state that an award of
$1,215,619 can be expected. But note, that amount does not
include burial costs and any other losses that a claimant seeks to
prove outside the value of presumed expected wage loss.
The analysis may not end there. If the Special Master were to
limit recovery to only that permitted by "applicable state law,"
the award could decrease appreciably. Under New York law, the
estate could not recover wage loss because there is no depen-
dency by any immediate family members. 244 This would de-
crease the award to approximately $250,000 for only the
presumed noneconomic loss.
Next, consider the recovery for a married decedent who was
age 45 with two dependents, earning $200,000 at the time of the
Terrorist Attacks. The Presumed Loss Tables state that an award
of $2,478,938 is the likely result of that claim. New York law
would not affect economic loss recovery unless the dependents
were other than children, in which case some limit might ob-
tain, depending on the degree of kinship of the dependents.
Importantly, an increase of the decedent's income to $1 million
per year might only marginally increase the award. Unless the
Special Master changes his position, this claimant would proba-
bly be awarded approximately $3 million.
B. APPLYING THE "SUPER" COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE
The benefits accorded these claimants by all sources, other
than charities, must next be deducted.245 With respect to the
single decedent, assume that she owned a life insurance policy
for $100,000 plus she received an additional $50,000 policy from
her employer. This deduction of $150,000 would leave an award
of approximately $1,065,213 to her estate. If New York law is
applied to the economic loss, recovery would decrease to
$250,000 less the $150,000 in collateral sources, leaving an
award of $100,000, but presumably not less than approximately
$250,000 to be awarded.
244 N.Y. EST. PowErs & TRUSTS §§ 5-4.4(a), 4-1.1 (Consol. 2001).
245 28 C.F.R. § 104.47(a).
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As for the married person, assume he had purchased a policy
with $1 million in coverage and had an additional $200,000 pol-
icy through his employer. Also, assume that his employer pays
death benefits to his family at $250,000. This would leave an
award of $1,028,938 for his family after these collateral source
deductions.
C. How CLAIMANTS MIGHT FARE AT THE COURTHOUSE
The process for determining a likely verdict for the two hypo-
thetical claimants involves numerous variables. The issue of
damages is not even ripe until the claimants could prove liabil-
ity. It is too soon after the Terrorist Attacks to identify any possi-
ble defendants and the potential theories against each.
However, liability should be considered so, at a minimum, there
is an appreciation of why it carries a much higher risk of no
recovery for most claimants. A comparison to the Fund does
not need to consider suit against terrorists, since such lawsuits
can be filed regardless of whether a claim is made to the Fund.
1. Liability
A comparison of damages from the two possible sources, the
Fund and a lawsuit, presumes that both have dependable
sources of payment for a damage award. The Fund does not
require proof of negligence, and the Treasury of the United
States backs its payments.246 Litigation, however, requires a
judgment, and litigation requires that the judgment must be col-
lected from a defendant. The risk of a plaintiff proceeding to
trial and ajury returning a defense verdict is a very real one in
almost every case. These circumstances are no different.
All actions must be filed in the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York.247 The Act requires that
the Court apply the law of the crash site, including the choice of
law Rules for that state.248 Consequently, Virginia law will be
applied to plaintiffs suing on behalf of persons injured or killed
in the Pentagon crash, Pennsylvania law for the Shanksville
crash, and New York law for the victims of the World Trade
Center crashes. The choice of law rules of those states might
then require that the law of states other than Virginia, Penn-
sylvania, or New York to govern certain issues in the case.
246 System Stabilization Act, supra note 1, § 406(b).
247 Id. § 408(b) (3).
248 Id. § 408(b) (2).
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The Court will likely apply the doctrine of depecage, whereby
the law of different jurisdictions governs particular issues in the
case. 249 Depecage has been repeatedly employed in aviation dis-
aster cases to apply separate law to issues of liability and dam-
ages.250 The Second Restatement on Conflict of Laws also
follows the doctrine of depecage 5'
First, the law that would control liability is unknown. Choice
of law would depend in part on what parties are sued by plain-
tiffs. Using the two hypothetical claimants, the New York choice
of law rules would look to the place of the tort.252 If aviation
industry companies were sued, the analysis would focus on the
location of where their alleged wrongful acts occurred, presum-
ably the states where relevant airports are located.
Second, proof of liability may be very difficult to locate and
admit in evidence.
Plaintiffs might pursue claims against the airport security
companies, alleging negligence for permitting the terrorists to
take on board the aircraft certain weapons used in the Terrorist
Attacks to control the aircraft. The proof of what items the ter-
rorists were able to bring through the security checkpoints, and
then use in the aircraft hijackings, is limited. Telephone com-
munications by persons on those aircraft before they crashed
and any information on cockpit voice recorders might provide
some details. Would those communications by recording or rec-
itation by a witness be admissible? Direct evidence of the ter-
rorists' actions might be available following a criminal trial by
the United States against those terrorists, thereby allowing plain-
tiff to use the evidence in support of a civil claim. However,
such a criminal trial might not occur until years after the expira-
tion of the statute of limitations for a civil action.
Moreover, plaintiffs would need to prove that the security per-
sonnel were negligent, in that the items were illegal to carry on
at that time and that a reasonable person under the circum-
stances would have been able to detect those items brought
through the security checkpoints. Since there is no indication
to date that firearms were used, the plaintiff would have a more
difficult time in proving that the security personnel should have
249 See, e.g., Hutner v. Greene, 734 F.2d 896, 901 (2d Cir. 1984) (reversible
error to apply law of one state all issues).
1!50 See, e.g., In reAircrash Disaster Near Roselawn, Ind. On Oct. 31, 1994, 926 F.
Supp. 736 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
251 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICTS OF LAWS §145 (1971).
252 See Padula v. Lilarn Props. Corp., 644 N.E.2d 1001, 1002-03 (N.Y. 1994).
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detected whatever items were smuggled through the checkpoint
and ultimately used as weapons. A claim against an airline is
more attenuated, but it might follow the same theory and simply
seek to impose liability on the basis that the airline hired the
security personnel.
A claim against government entities that own or operate rele-
vant airports where the terrorists gained access to the aircraft
might not satisfy rules for good faith claims, or at a minimum
would be far more difficult to prove. The airports did not have
direct responsibility to hire security personnel for the check-
points. Thus, these claims would have to first establish a duty
owed to the passengers, in addition to aforementioned burden
of proof concerning negligence by the security personnel at the
checkpoint.
Finally, if a plaintiff were successful in a claim against any of
these aviation industry companies, the same issue of a collectible
judgment would remain. Airline industry defendants (except
for the security companies) are immune from a judgment that
exceeds insurance policy limits. 253 While those policies may
have significant limits of $1.5 billion for each of the aircraft and
perhaps equal or greater limits for the airports, those funds
would be consumed quickly following the execution of several
judgments. The security companies do not enjoy similar protec-
tions from the Act, but their insurance and assets might be
quickly exhausted following a series of judgments against them.
2. Damages
With respect to the choice of law for damages, the analysis
involves fewer variables than liability and is generally predict-
able. Considering the two hypothetical claimants suing on be-
half of decedents at the World Trade Center site, the New York
choice of law rules employs "interest analysis" to determine what
jurisdiction has the greatest interest in having its law govern
damages. New York has moved away from the historical lex loci
delecti approach to tort cases, recognizing that the location of
the event causing the injury is often fortuitous or insignificant in
comparison to other facts related to the event.254 The analysis
concerns the significant contacts with the parties and the juris-
diction in which they are located, as well as whether the purpose
253 System Stabilization Act, supra note 1, § 408(a).
254 In re Allstate Ins. Co. v. Stolarz, 613 N.E.2d 936, 939 (N.Y. 1993).
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of the law applied will be regulation of conduct or allocation of
lOSS. 2 5
In cases involving loss allocation, which would include a
wrongful death statute, New York applies three rules established
in its early decision, Neumeier v. Kuehner.256 The first "Neumeier
Rule" requires that, if the parties share a common domicile, the
law of that jurisdiction should control.257 Second, if the parties
reside in different domiciles, and the injury occurred in the
domicile of one party, the law of that domicile will apply.2
58
Third, if the parties are from different domiciles and the injury
occurred in neither domicile, the law of the place where the
accident occurred applies unless applying a different law would
"advance the relevant substantive law purposes" of the jurisdic-
tions involved.259
With respect to the two hypothetical persons killed in the New
York attack, who were domiciliaries of New York, New York law
will almost certainly govern damages. New York undoubtedly
has the greatest interest in governing the recovery of its own
citizens for an accident that occurs in the state. If airline indus-
try defendants are sued, it is likely that New York law would still
govern damages since the Neumeier rules would require the ap-
plication of the law where one party resides and where the acci-
dent also occurred.
If the two decedents had been domiciliaries of a state other
than New York, New York law might still govern damages. Al-
though the state where plaintiffs live may have an interest in
governing the damages recovered, the third Neumeier rule re-
quires that the law of the place where the event occurred gov-
erns absent a basis to displace that law. The choice of law
analysis might also involve whether the plaintiffs were working at
the World Trade Center in the course of their normal employ-
ment and maintained offices there or were simply transitory visi-
tors on the day of the attack. Those in the former category are
far more likely to have New York law govern the damage
recovery.
New York law is therefore likely to govern these two hypotheti-
cal claims arising from the World Trade Center attacks. These
255 Cooney v. Ozgood Mach., Inc., 612 N.E.2d 277, 281 (N.Y. 1993).
2- 286 N.E.2d 454, 457-58 (N.Y. 1972).
257 Id. at 457.
258 Id.
259 Id. at 458; Cooney, 612 N.E.2d at 281.
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plaintiffs would recover damages for economic loss to the extent
that family members designated by statute could prove financial
dependency on the decedent. Thus, claims for single decedents
who had no dependents could result in their estates being
awarded virtually no damages for economic loss.260
Moreover, New York law does not permit wrongful death
claimants to recover damages for grief of the surviving family
members, nor does it law allow hedonic damages to compensate
for loss of enjoyment of life.261 The estates could obtain an
award for pre-impact emotional distress.262 The award would be
sustainable on appeal if in the range of $200-$500,000.263
The application of New York law would result in awards for
single decedents without dependents that will be, on average,
far less than the awards for those same persons by the Fund.
Awards by the Fund will, at a minimum, provide a non-economic
loss component of $250,000 to the decedent's estate and, in
most cases, at least, $250,000 for economic loss. Litigation may
provide virtually no recovery for economic loss and perhaps less
than $250,000 for noneconomic loss.
In reviewing the first of two hypothetical claimants, the estate
of the single decedent with no dependents had been awarded at
least $100,000 after collateral source deductions and possibly as
much $1 million if the Special Master does not impose the New
York wrongful death law restriction on the recovery. Alterna-
tively, the award by a jury would be small in comparison once
the wrongful death law is strictly applied by them or by the trial
judge and the Second Circuit.
For those decedents with persons financially dependent upon
them, the relative benefit of litigation versus the Fund will de-
pend upon the earnings of the decedent and the amount of
money received from collateral sources. The hypothetical mar-
ried decedent with dependents would present an analysis similar
to that conducted pursuant to the Rule with respect to increases
26 See, e.g., Abruzzo v. City of N.Y., 649 N.Y.S.2d 172, 173 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996)
(verdict for $1.2 million reduced to $150,000 for single decedent with no finan-
cial dependents); Dilger v. Consol. Rail Corp., No. 95 Civ. 9674, 1997 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 1027, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 1997), aff'd, 133 F.3d 906 (2d Cir. 1997)
(upholding jury award of $75,000 for economic loss in similar circumstances).
261 Gonzalez v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth., 572 N.E.2d 598, 600-01 (N.Y. 1991).
262 See N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS § 11-3.2(b) (Consol. 2001).
263 See, e.g., Dilger, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1027, at *10-11 ($675,000 in pre-and
post impact distress, including twenty-five minutes of pain and suffering from
severe injuries); Lang v. Bouju, 667 N.Y.S.2d 440 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) ($239,000
for pre-impact fear in motorcycle crash reduced to $100,000).
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in compensation over the remainder of the decedent's work life,
corresponding deductions for consumption, and a reduction to
present value. In periods of low to moderate inflation, two to
five percent, the expected increases in pay are generally
equivalent to present value reduction, such as the 5.13 percent
used by the Special Master. Consequently, simply multiplying
income of the decedent by the remaining years in his work life
can very roughly approximate an award. Here, the hypothetical
decedent earning $200,000.00 per year with twenty years of
work-life could be expected to receive up to $4 million in in-
come, before deductions for consumption. Thus, the Special
Master's award of approximately $2 million is lower but not sig-
nificantly different from the award that might be returned by a
jury and upheld on appeal.
However, the reduction for collateral sources for that claim-
ant would reduce the award by the Fund to $1 million. No such
deduction would occur in a lawsuit applying New York law.
Therefore, the married decedent with dependents would likely
receive a verdict of higher value in litigation than in a claim to
the Fund. His estate would receive as much as $3 to $4 million
for economic loss and approximately $200,000 to $500,000 for a
survival claim, resulting in ajury award of $3.2 to $4.5 million.
D. WEIGHING LITIGATION RISKS WILL LEAD MOST TO SEEK
FUND AWARDS
The very real risks of a liability trial must be assessed before
one can conclude that it is worthwhile to proceed with litigation
in lieu of a claim to the Fund. A simple analysis of a potential
recovery from a jury versus expected recovery from the Fund
would be misguided and fail to account for other problems that
a plaintiff would encounter in attempting to proceed to a col-
lectible judgment in a lawsuit. The share of any judgment that
must be provided to pay counsel must also be a factor in com-
parison to the absence of a fee or very modest fee that a claim-
ant would pay for filing with the Fund.
For most claimants, the consideration of those litigation risks
will lead them to seek predictable awards from the Fund that are
guaranteed for payment in 120 days. The potential claimants
for whom litigation initially appears to be the best option are
those with significant collateral source reductions. Their awards
from the Fund could be quite low. If true, those claimants
would then have only that minimal award to lose in seeking re-
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covery through litigation, to the extent they are able to present a
good faith claim against any entity.
V. IS THE PROTECTION OF THE AIRLINE
INDUSTRY JUSTIFIED?
The Government has quickly authorized the expenditure of
up to $15 billion in direct assistance to airlines, and it author-
ized further support of the industry of at least $10 billion
through restrictions on lawsuits and a corresponding establish-
ment of the Fund. Congress must be able to justify its spending
of taxpayer funds. Even for an institution that measures its
budget by the trillions, this Government allocation is worthy of
notice and examination.
The assertion that Congress should have done nothing to as-
sist the industry and nothing to help preserve American jobs can
be justified only by a defense of free market capitalism in its
purest form. If the Government consistently maintained a pos-
ture of refraining from involvement in private industry, that ap-
proach might be justified. Yet, Government fingerprints are
constantly found on the ledgers of most corporations in
America.
Subsidies similar to this aid package are routinely enacted in
the form of tax benefits for corporations. The bailout of the
Chrysler Corporation targeted saving the jobs of a particular
company. The Small Business Administration exists to help fos-
ter certain types of corporations. The list could go on with ex-
amples of how the Government seeks to support certain
industries or even particular corporations. Whether each of
those efforts is justified is not relevant for this discussion. The
fact that it occurs is sufficient to review whether aid to the air-
line industry is a wise investment for the American taxpayer.
In passing the Act, several members of Congress left no doubt
as to what value they place on the airline industry as a part of
our economic infrastructure:
[The airline industry] is a critical component to our way of life
and a vital segment of our national economy. Our airlines move
people and products across America and throughout the world.
They serve not just business and tourism but can, quite literally,
determine whether we are able to compete in a global
economy.
264
264 147 CONG. REc. H5884 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 2001) (statement of Rep.
Reynolds).
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Upon review of quarterly and end-of-the-year losses, the effect
of the Terrorist Attacks on the airline corporations is
undeniable.26 -
Make no mistake, there is strong bipartisan support for stabiliz-
ing America's air transportation system and for ensuring the vic-
tims of September 11 get the assistance they need as they rebuild
their lives. How to do those things is a difficult and complex
question, but a crucially important one. At stake is nothing less
than the strength of the economy, hundreds of thousands of
American jobs, and our values and way of life.2 66
"[I]t is our responsibility to preserve the American aviation
industry. 26 7
The statistics concerning unemployment caused by deteriora-
tion of the industry are also objective and compelling. Approxi-
mately 100,000jobs in the aviation industry were lost in the first
ten days after the Terrorist Attacks. 268 The Boeing Company
alone announced a layoff of 30,000 workers.2 69 By one estimate,
for every 100 jobs created by the airline industry, an additional
250 jobs are created by those industries that service the air-
lines.2 v0 Companies that provide fuel, maintenance, engine
overhauls, food service, uniforms, and so many other services
are all dependent on the continued operation of the airlines.
Consequently, the jolt to the industry put at risk another
250,000 jobs. This data does not begin to measure the spillover
into thousands of businesses that require regular air travel to
reach their customers and vendors in the United States and
throughout the world, and which, in turn, support hotels, car
rental agencies, taxis, and other businesses.
Some amount of aid to the industry is necessary to help save
these jobs, but that aid should be dispensed with caution, as the
Board has exercised in reviewing the first applications for the
Government-backed loan program. The grant program might
have benefited from the use of some discretion by Government
officials in dispensing up to $5 billion in payouts for lost busi-
ness. While the volume of business before the Terrorist Attacks
is one indicia of how to divide that money among the many air-
265 See, e.g., airline losses reported supra note 57.
266 147 CONG. REC. H5884 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 2001) (statement of Rep. Frost).
267 Id. at H5887 (statement of Rep. Thune).
68 Id. at H5885 (statement of Rep. Hastings).
269 Id. at H5891 (statement of Rep. Dicks).
270 Id. at H5885 (statement of Rep. Hastings).
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lines seeking aid, the Act should have included other factors for
consideration by the Board or by a similarly constituted panel.
The liability limitations against potential industry defendants,
procedural constraints on lawsuits, creation of the Fund, and
the extending of excess coverage for future terrorist-related lia-
bility all find justification in a goal other than protecting carriers
as a vital component in the American economic engine. A legit-
imate concern exists to avoid a withdrawal by the aviation insur-
ance market. The Act contains no reimbursement or direct
protection of those insurers. Yet these types of litigation relief
will help maintain the availability of insurance by discouraging
litigation against policyholders and by encouraging use of the
Fund.
One might argue that juries would return fair verdicts against
airlines, airports, and manufacturers and find liability only if evi-
dence was duly presented to persuade reasonable persons of
their culpability for the Terrorist Attacks. But that result could
be reached only if the insurers of those airlines paid the high
costs for defending against thousands of claims in various juris-
dictions and appeal each adverse verdict. The reality is that a
very high percentage of all civil cases, including aviation litiga-
tion, settle before trial. Concern over costs could easily lead to
insurers settling claims, but also result in them refusing to re-
write these same risks again.
Not unlike the domino effect on the commercial side of the
airline business, an extreme volume of litigation could have the
same debilitating effect on the insurance market and conse-
quently on the industry's ability to do business. Lack of insur-
ance can translate to difficulty for carriers and manufacturers to
obtain credit from lenders. Lack of credit means an inability for
those companies to invest in new equipment and remain com-
petitive in the world market.
An enhanced role for Government in the aviation industry is
necessary for a crisis of the magnitude experienced following
the Terrorist Attacks. How fast, how involved, and how long an
intervention is needed will unfold over the first eighteen
months after September 1 th.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Government has decided to expend significant amounts
of taxpayer funds and exercise a more involved role in the con-
tinued viability of the aviation industry. With that role comes
2002]
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the responsibility of using discretion to decide what portions of
the industry most require aid and which corporations within
those business areas warrant assistance. The extension of credit
in exchange for equity in carriers, excess insurance coverage for
terrorist risks, control of carrier routes, and litigation alterna-
tives may save jobs and benefit the economy overall. These
same measures will carry risks for a Government that becomes
too deeply involved in the day-to-day operations of carriers or
the financial well being of particular corporations.
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